The increasing demand for oil and gas before the global recession was driving up prices and the focus of oil and gas producers was to maintain and maximise production from every available facility. [1] and IEC 61511 [2] compliance audits undertaken for SIS replacement projects on live production facilities.
Introduction
Live replacement of SIS creates two main issues:
· Maintaining process integrity during the SIS replacement; · Avoiding the significant potential for spurious trips whilst transferring safety functions to the replacement system. The decision to maintain production during the SIS replacement is driven by avoidance of production losses sustained when the process is shut down, even though a live SIS replacement will be more costly. Thus the focus of project management is also, unfortunately, all too often on the avoidance of spurious trips during installation at the expense of maintaining integrity. In some cases little or no attempt is made to undertake a hazard analysis to identify the project related hazards created by a live SIS replacement.
Operators often use the argument that a SIS replacement is 'simply a like-for-like modification' and, as a consequence, projects may not budget for any validation testing following replacement even though:
§ Replacing the logic solver impacts on every safety instrumented function (SIF); § They are most probably rationalising the cause and effect logic configuration; § The I/O interface architecture may also be significantly different; § Field-fitted elements may be replaced.
So the argument of like-for-like may have little foundation. The lifecycle phases of IEC 61508 [1] and IEC 61511 [2] requires completion of commissioning and validation before hazards are introduced, and they were not developed or structured for SIS projects to be implemented on live process plant with hazards present. Thus it is always going to be difficult, if not impossible, to fully comply with the life-cycle framework. Figure 1 is an overview of the IEC 61511 life-cycle phases, but replacing a SIS is of greater significance than making a 'modification' to the functionality. The SIS replacement project should still follow the SIS safety life-cycle phases but certain phases need to be further developed to embrace live process plant. Figure 2 suggests a more pragmatic 'route map' for the management of a live SIS replacement project and shows input activities required to satisfy project stages as square 'activity' boxes. Project progression stages are shown as AND gates. The orange-shaded activities indicate where specific considerations need to be developed for a live process. It can be seen that risk assessments are embedded in many of the activities. Training starts early in the project as a large number of operational people need to be familiarised with the changes, and these people are likely to work complex shift patterns.
Following the SIS Safety Life-cycle phases
The main gated progression phases still follow the IEC 61511 life-cycle as follows: § Hazard identification and risk assessment (IEC 61511 phases 1-3; § Design, engineering and FAT (IEC 61511 phase 4); § Training;
Hazard and risk assessment
The risks involved in undertaking a live SIS replacement must be clearly defined during the project development phase and address the project impact on the integrity of the facility due to systematic errors with respect to the replacement specification, design and implementation.
Some of the typical systematic errors that have been encountered include failure to check that secure power supplies and HVAC can handle loading from two ESD/PSD and F&G systems running concurrently, during the time it takes to transfer all the functionality from the old to the new SIS.
Functionality for outstanding plant changes may be added and this will require specific hazard analysis and risk assessments to establish the additional SIF requirements.
I/O transfer between the old and new SIS will result in the repeated loss of 'key' safety functionality for periods of time. Hazards and associated risks during the physical transfer of I/O new need to be identified.
Thus there are some significant assessments that should be made as follows: § Whether the integrity of the facility is compromised and, if so, how; § Whether the SIS functionality is identical or if changes to the Cause and Effects are proposed; § Whether like-for-like functional testing/comparison is going to be possible; § Whether the I/O transfer is true like-for like; § Any changes to the actual I/O interfaces; § The physical constraints for moving I/O such as terminal connectivity; § The risks involved with the physical disconnection and reconnection such as the implications of a spurious closure of a primary process valve; § The risks due to the unavailability of functionality during the physical changeover; § How to avoid loss of functionality whilst moving physical I/O; § How to keep operations informed about what functionality is on which system; § What to do in the event of a real facility emergency if work is in progress. Unfortunately many of the above issues are often not considered, due to the hazy or vague like-for-like approach.
Allocation of Safety Functions to Protection Layers
The majority of the SIS functions should already be defined from the existing system, and only those functions that are to be added as plant change requirements during the upgrade opportunity, should need to be considered. However, even though the bulk of the functionality will most likely be identical, the opportunity may well be taken to rationalise the cause and effect logic and this needs hazard analysis. SIL determination and design calculations may not even have been completed for the original system configuration.
Safety Requirements Specification for the SIS
The safety requirements specification for a replacement SIS will depend on a number of factors such as: § How close the replacement system design is to the original; § The as-built status of the cause and effects; § Whether the cause and effects are to be replicated; § Whether the cause and effects have been rationalised; § Whether the field elements will remain the same; § The suitability of the current measured values and ranges; § The suitability of the current set points; § Changes to the basic process control system (BPCS) and its interfaces; § Whether a SIL determination study was done for the original system; § Whether the design calculations exist for original system; § The basis on which the existing system test strategy was developed.
In many cases the as-built status of the cause and effects may be suspect; particularly if there have been significant poorly documented changes over the operating life of the original system. Add in changes that have been waiting to take advantage of a replacement SIS opportunity, and configuration of the replacement SIS could be significantly different from the original.
SIS replacement project teams are usually only interested in replicating the current calibration and set points; which may not be up to date in the documentation. By simply copying the configuration in this way all bad settings will also be replicated. Examination of the measured variable ranges and set point settings all too often reveal some very suspicious data such as rising set points that are set 100% full scale or falling set points that are set at 0% full scale.
More close examination of a replacement SIS project scope may also reveal that a number of initiating devices, final elements and I/O communications are also to be replaced or upgraded, and are not in fact like-for-like.
Design and Engineering of the SIS
The extent and detail of the design and engineering scope will also be impacted by the bulleted factors highlighted in Section 3 above. 
Feature: SIS Replacement on Live Processes
The like-for-like argument could mean re-implementing inadequate SIF design yet few SIS change out projects are prepared to review or undertake SIS design calculations, even though the logic solver will change, field elements may change and I/O interfaces are often modified.
Rationalisation of SIS functionality also impacts greatly on the application software configuration, making it difficult, if not impossible, to do a like-for-like comparison of the old and replacement configurations. The whole configuration must therefore be checked by comprehensive factory acceptance testing (FAT).
A replacement SIS is often undertaken simultaneously with a full upgrade to the (BPCS) and this can have a significant impact on the human machine interface (HMI). The operators of the BPCS and SIS need to be fully involved in the design and development of the HMI and the project must be prepared to provide training as part of their scope. Figure 3 shows an example where a project was introducing some fundamental I/O interface modifications by replacing the SIS logic solver. The old SIS used barrier diodes, power off to operate, and 1 wire I/O connections whilst the replacement SIS was to use intrinsically safe (IS) interfaces, power on to operate and 2 wire connections. Figure 4 shows an example where the replacement SIS required significant changes to the I/O communications interfaces between the CPU and the field elements. The project considered the SIS shown in Figure 4 as certified to a SIL 3 capability. They failed to appreciate that certification was only for the logic solver and did not include the communications network and I/O modules which had no reliability data and introduced significant common cause failure issues.
Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)
The objectives of FAT for a replacement SIS on a live process must be far more comprehensive and extend much further than the testing of the logic solver and associated software as indicated in Part 1, Section 13 of IEC 61511. When site installation is undertaken this will involve connecting directly with existing field elements while the process is live. So FAT must also embrace elements of site acceptance testing and validation.
The boundaries and content of FAT must be planned to cover: § All interfaces with other systems such as BPCS and F&G systems; § Suitability of Communications links § All human machine interfaces; § Content and accuracy of all graphic displays; § Checks for compatibility of input field element types with measurements, ranges and set points; § Checks for compatibility for all output field element types such as solenoids, switch gear etc.; § A full check of the cause and effects for every initiator and associated final element/s; § Clock synchronisation of multiple clocks; § Logic solver performance; § Input to output performance; § Application software testing. Figure 5 shows an outline of the FAT boundaries for a typical ESD/ PSD related SIS replacement, and the FAT scope should extend right out to the I/O field interfaces with simulations for all field elements. This will ensure as seamless as possible integration with the field elements, which are all that remain of the old SIS in this example.
A similar approach is required for F&G systems or any other functional safety related unit of logic.
All faults detected during FAT must be logged and cleared before the system is shipped.
Installation, Cutover, Commissioning and Testing
The cabinet installation space and the loading capacity of secure power supplies and HVAC to support both the old and the replacement system for the changeover period should be verified. 
Feature: SIS Replacement on Live Processes
Fundamental points but all too often missed by some projects and only discovered when it is far too late. Another fundamental item often overlooked is whether the actual terminals (e.g. Klippon terminals), associated with the SIS outputs for all normally powered field elements, can support the connection of a temporary 24 Volt supply. This is to hold the field element in the powered state whilst the wires are physically moved (i.e. cutover) to the new system. Another potential issue is whether there is sufficient room to access individual terminals without interfering with adjacent ones used on different SIF's.
Installation
The replacement SIS is therefore initially installed along side the old system but without any I/O connections to the field elements. This will probably require special software programs or 'hooks' to be installed to transfer data between the two systems to ensure that both systems track measured variables and can operate all the final elements for any input initiation.
Cutover
The process of cutover must form specific work packs taking cognisance of the following: § Other site work in progress; § Other work packs associated with cutover; § The plant status i.e. stability and operational plans for the period;
The associated risks with respect to safety and production; § The required emergency response procedures specific to each work pack; § The overrides/inhibits that are required to perform the work; § Specific operational precautions required during the work.
Work packs form part of the daily site permit to work (PTW) meetings which are held to discuss operational, maintenance and construction plans for the day. The safety risks and production risks must be examined and proposals made for any special operational precautions that will need to be put in place e.g. additional diligence by the control room operator (CRO) with alarm monitoring, the permanent display of specific graphics for the area and what communications is to be established between the CRO and the technicians undertaking the cut over work.
The control room operator must agree to, and log, every override/ inhibit being placed and removed. Cutover must have detailed planning and regular status updates to avoid loosing sight of what SIF elements are connected to which system. The normally energised final elements for an ESD/PSD system have to remain powered by a temporary power source, whilst the wires are physically transferred. Thus the unavailability exposure time needs to be kept to an absolute minimum. It is also at this stage where any momentary loss of supply to a final element will result in a spurious trip. Both risks should be assessed.
Wherever possible, offline or spared equipment should be transferred first, and then swapped to minimise the risks. Power on to initiate devices for systems such as F&G have no risk of spurious initiation, and end of line monitoring facilities in the SIS should indicate a successful transfer.
The initiators are inhibited on both old and new SIS prior to transfer and a simple check on measured value before and after transfer provides a preliminary indication that the transfer has been successful.
Commissioning and Validation Testing
There will be significant difficulties in undertaking fully functional end-to-end testing of the majority of functions with the process operational, so on site validation testing is most certainly going to be compromised and must be resolved by a partitioned approach.
Providing FAT was comprehensive, as discussed earlier, full advantage should be taken of the off line opportunities afforded at this stage to reduce site validation requirements.
Advantage also needs to be taken of records of previous routine tests for ESD and F&G initiating devices and all final elements for the original system. This will then have proven the functionality of all the field elements at the last test. But are the test records dependable?
FAT should have tested the SIS logic, all I/O communications and all the I/O using simulation up to the field termination. Thus the objective of validation for each field I/O is to ensure that they are connected to the correct termination and that they remain functional.
Fire and Gas Systems
The compatibility of new detectors and remaining detectors should have been simulated at FAT. All remaining detectors should have been subject to routine testing. The objective of validation is to ensure that the detectors are connected to their assigned input terminals and they are being read correctly by the replacement SIS. This can be achieved by overriding them and testing with simulated gas or smoke etc. The site test does not have to be a full calibration routine providing this was done at FAT.
Digital type inputs from break glass units and push buttons etc. should have been routinely tested. FAT should have checked the SIS with simulated digital inputs to check all inputs activate appropriately. Thus the objective of validation is to ensure the initiating devices are connected to their assigned input terminals and that they are being read correctly by the replacement SIS. To confirm this, each digital should be line monitored and exercised (using input inhibits), following wiring changeover.
All F&G outputs should have been tested during FAT. The objective of validation is to ensure that the power-to-activate devices are connected to their assigned terminals and that they are being line monitored correctly by the replacement SIS following wiring transfer. If it is possible to lock off deluge release and dispersant release devices, to prevent a release, then it is recommended that outputs tested by activation from within the replacement SIS HMI.
ESD, PSD and EDP Systems
All initiator analogue measurement devices should have been subject to routine testing and calibration. FAT should have checked the replacement SIS with simulated inputs and ensured that they have the appropriate engineering units, scaling, ranges and set points. The objective of validation is therefore to ensure that the transmitters and sensors are connected to their assigned input terminals and that they are being read correctly by the replacement SIS.
It is recommended that the measured value of each initiator is noted and recorded prior to changeover, and then checked against the replacement SIS, and any corresponding process control variable, following the wiring changeover. Wherever possible, it is recommended that input have an override applied and operations move the process variables up or down by about 10% to check they track the change.
Digital inputs from normally closed contacts and push buttons etc. should have been subject to routine testing. FAT should have checked the replacement SIS with simulated digital inputs and ensured that all inputs are connected to the correct termination and activate appropriately. To confirm this, each digital should be
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The objective of final element validation, is to ensure that de-energise to activate devices are connected to their assigned input terminals and that they are being correctly powered and can be de-energised by the replacement SIS. The transfer of normally energised outputs is perhaps the hardest of all transfers and this aspect has already been discussed. It is assumed that all final element devices such as valves and motors contactors will have been subject to routine testing. All outputs in the replacement SIS should have been tested during FAT. It is recommended that all solenoid valves are trip tested, by de-energising them through the replacement SIS HMI if possible with: § Prior risk assessment for each valve and instructions in the event of a platform emergency; § Normally open ESD, PSD and EDP valves mechanically locked open; § Normally closed ESD, PSD and EDP valves mechanically locked closed. For electrical drives it is recommended that off line spared equipment is tested such that: § Each offline contactor is physically trip tested; § The offline machine changed over to become on line; § The contactor test is repeated for the drives that have just become offline. Where electrical drives have no spared equipment then this will need more thought and the earliest shutdown opportunity should be taken to carry out the trip test.
Operations and Maintenance
Operators should form part of the project team and should play a key role in every phase of the project. Their training on the new SIS should begin early so that they can appreciate the technology and add value to the design and development. They should be fully participant in the HMI interface development including the design of the graphics, FAT and co-ordination of installation and cutover.
Maintenance personnel should be trained in the new technology at an early stage to enable them to be involved in the installation commissioning and validation phases so that they become fully familiar with all aspects of the hardware and application software functionality.
The ongoing test and maintenance strategy should naturally formulate through the SIS design and SIF specific PFD calculations. However, projects are seen to proceed with no basis for setting test and maintenance strategies apart from the like-for like argument which is so often flawed.
Conclusions
Replacing a SIS is always going to be safer and less risky when the process is shut down. This removes most of the associated integrity and production issues as well as the additional stress related to working on integrity systems on a live process. The time taken and the project costs will also be considerably less. Full commissioning and validation will also be possible before the process starts up again.
The high demand for oil and gas and increasing prices will return. This will drive operators to replace of SIS without stopping production and that is always going to create integrity and production related issues. Projects must ensure that the risks are fully identified and evaluated and they should not shortcut the standards by arguing like-for-like since this is so often far from the mark.
Providing projects follow the route map set out in Figure 2 , it will be possible to achieve the replacement of a SIS on live process plant. By following these steps a replacement SIS can be seamlessly dovetailed into a live process plant with minimum loss of integrity and avoidance of lost production, but the required attention to detail will result in far more headaches for the project during the whole process.
However, SIS replacement while a process is shut down should always be the preferred option.
